Toyota sedang mengalami ujian berat - PART 01

[asudarsono]

Kalau kita bicara "dari posisi berhenti" ya namanya yg lainnya dibuat gelap bro.

[asudarsono]

More than 1,000 Toyota and Lexus owners have reported since 2001 that their vehicles suddenly accelerated on their own, in many cases slamming into trees, parked cars and brick walls, among other obstacles, a Times review of federal records has found.

The crashes resulted in at least 19 deaths and scores of injuries over the last decade, records show. Federal regulators say that is far more than any other automaker has experienced.

Owner complaints helped trigger at least eight investigations into sudden acceleration in Toyota and Lexus vehicles by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in the last seven years. Toyota Motor Corp. recalled fewer than 85,000 vehicles in response to two of those probes, and the federal agency closed six other cases without finding a defect.

But those investigations systematically excluded or dismissed the majority of complaints by owners that their Toyota and Lexus vehicles had suddenly accelerated, which sharply narrowed the scope of the probes, the Times investigation revealed.

Federal officials eliminated broad categories of sudden-acceleration complaints, including cases in which drivers said they were unable to stop runaway cars using their brakes; incidents of unintended acceleration lasting more than a few seconds; and reports in which owners did not identify the possible causes of the problem.

NHTSA officials used the exclusions as part of their rationale to close at least five of the investigations without finding any defect, because -- with fewer incidents to consider -- the agency concluded there were not enough reported problems to warrant further inquiry. In a 2003 Lexus probe, for example, the agency threw out all but one of 37 customer complaints cited in a defect petition. It then halted further investigation, saying it "found no data indicating the existence of a defect trend."

Meanwhile, fatal crashes involving Toyota vehicles continued to mount.

http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/08 ... ta-recall8

TERLEPAS DARI POLEMIK PR INI, DIPASANGNYA BRAKE OVERRIDE SYSTEM PADA LEXUS SANGAT DIHARGAI, SEMOGA MENJADI STANDAR INDUSTRI SELANJUTNYA

[FortunerMan]

Sama kaya kasus Audi, banyak kasusnya yg dilaporkan. Tidak pernah ketemu ada technical defectnya, dan dinyatakan tidak bersalah. Kalo mau ngotot juga...ya terserah Tapi itu fakta teknisnya - insinyur Jerman dan Amerika bukan bloon, dan mereka nggak nemu apa2 di Audi 5000...driver rata2 mungkin saja ada yg bloon.

[asudarsono]

Ya kalau mau dibilang bloon gitu, ya terserah, tapi menurut saya pengemudi Toyota cerdas2 aja. Kadang ada yg ngotot sih, tapi gak apa2 khan. Namanya juga diskusi yg sehat.

Bro, kenapa cruise control dibatasi max 100 kpj, ya belajar dari kasus Mr Audi itu. Kalau sekarang dibilang Audi nggak ada apa2, juga bagi saya nggak masalah krn problem solved. Terima kasih kepada insinyur2 VW yang sangat bertanggung jawab.

Udah ah, udah mau pasang brake override, saya pikir udah cukup. Yg penting problem solved. Yg lain2 di balik itu biar kita aja yg paham.

[maskopat]

kalo cuman cuap2 dan bungkuk2 doang mah...

posting di sini realisasi jawaban toyota terhadap ujian yang berat ini...

Jawaban toyota udah jelas banget:
1. Recall mobil2nya free of charge
2. Stop penjualan mobil2 laku nya (camry, corolla, rav4, dll) sampe mereka dapet part penggantinya, walaupun mereka tau bakalan rugi besar
3. Diler2nya disuruh buka sampe malem (malah ada yg 24/7) supaya semua mobil2 konsumen bisa diperbaiki dengan cepat.
4. Toyota bagi2 duit ke dealer2nya (up to 75k/ dealer) untuk melayani konsumen misalnya kasi replacement car kalo perlu, entertain customer2 yg nunggu di dealer, dll
5. Dari segi PREVENTIF, toyota bakal meng-install Brake Override System (kalo rem diinjek, akselerasi otomatis terputus) di SEMUA mobil Toyota, Lexus, dan Scion sebelum thn 2010 berakhir.
6. Untuk bonusnya, semua mobil baru toyota sekarang gratis maintenance selama 2 tahun, bunga 0% selama 5 tahun, dll

Itu semua udah jawaban toyota yg real, bukan cuma cuap2
Bos atoyot aja sampe dateng ke kongress bungkuk2 minta maaf.....artinya toyota itu udah humble banget. Jarang banget eksekutip mobil import yg dateng ke depan kongress bungkuk2 minta maaf pada saat mobilnya di recall.....
Kalo semua hal diatas udah dilakukan oleh toyota, maka wajarlah banyak dari masyarakat sini (yg rata2 berpikiran rasional dan gak gampang kepancing isu2) masih percaya dengan produk2 dan kualitas merek toyota.....makanya mereka pada mulai beli lagi tu mobil2 toyota, apalagi ada bonus2 spt disebut diatas.

Memang bener, walaupun effort2 tsb udah dilakukan/dikomitmetkan oleh toyota, tetep engga bisa merubah kenyataan dalam semalem.......perlu adanya proses. Kalo ane jadi toyota sih biarin aja orang2 yg masih pesimis ngata-ngatain terus, yg penting komitmen untuk memperbaiki/meningkatkan kualitas jalan terus, sehingga ujung2nya pasar yg nilai sendiri apakah worth it lagi tuker uang mereka dengan sebuah toyota

Tapi kurang tepat rasanya kalo toyota dibilang cuma cuap2 dan engga ada effort kongkret untuk mengatasi defect ini......

bagus lah kalo gitu... trus, sampe sekarang, sudah berapa mobil yang direcall? apakah masih kejadian masalah ini pada mobil2 yang sudah direcall?

trus, gimana tentang korban yang meninggal? belum ada tindak lanjutnya?

[teunget]

ujiannya udah kelar belum nih.....kok belum ada undangan makan2nya?

[solar_kerosen]

Pelajaran buat toyota , jangan terlalu banyak memproduksi mobil , hingga menyebabkan mobil amerika kalah bersaing sehingga tidak laku dan membuat pemerintah memutar otak atau taktik .

tentang mobil toyota saya rasa kualitas cukup mumpuni untuk pasar amerika walaupun mereka pelan tapi pasti MENGGEROGOTI pasar mobil2 amerika dari produsen lokal .

[Risol1]

bagus lah kalo gitu... trus, sampe sekarang, sudah berapa mobil yang direcall? apakah masih kejadian masalah ini pada mobil2 yang sudah direcall?

trus, gimana tentang korban yang meninggal? belum ada tindak lanjutnya?

Yah bos... ane gak tau lah udah berapa mobil yg di recall.
Toyota udah lakukan tugasnya yaitu mengumumkan model mobil yg direcall (jenis, tahun pembuatan, VIN, dll). Pengumuman juga udah dimumkan dimana2: di national tv, koran2, website resmi, radio, surat dari dealer, dll....

Nah tinggal si konsumen sendiri yg memutuskan mao engga bawa mobilnya ke dealer buat diperbaiki. Bbrp minggu yg lalu sih kalo ane pas lewatin dealer toyota itu memang penuh berjejer sama mobil2 yg kena recall (camry, corolla, highlander, dkk.....). Pokoknya komitmen toyota itu konsumen engga ada yg ditolak cuma karena faktor jam operasi dealer, artinya selama konsumen mao nunggu, itu mobil biasanya pasti di benerin engga perduli sampe jam berapa mekanik2 toyota itu harus lembur.

Jadi sekarang jawaban ttg "berapa mobil yg udah direcall?" udah tergantung dari "Berapa banyak konsumen yg udah bawa mobilnya ke dealer?" karena kalo dari pihak toyota, mereka pasti terima dengan tangan terbuka kalo ada konsumen yg dateng

Kalo ttg santunan buat yg meninggal, yah sama aja kasusnya kalo ada orang mati dan katanya gara2 keracunan tel botol sosro
Yg pasti sih diselidiki dulu apakah bener teh botol sosro mengandung racun, kalo engga ya pasti disangkal lah sama produsen sosro. Kalo iya, ya pasti ada santunan lah.

Begitu juga dengan toyota. Kalo memang mati gara2 defect mobil, pasti ada settlement dari toyota. Tapi sekarang ini banyaknya orang2 yg mao mengambil kesempatan aja. Nabrak gara2 meleng tapi bilangnya mobilnya ngegas sendiri

Bayangin aja 3 bulan lalu adem2 aja, sekarang tiba2 ada 2-3 kasus masuk media per hari ttg Toyota yg ngegas sendiri Kan itu namanya ada orang2 yg nyari kesempatan aje......

[Risol1]

Kalau kita bicara "dari posisi berhenti" ya namanya yg lainnya dibuat gelap bro.

Maksudnya posisi berhenti gimana bos? Unintended acceleration nya toyota bukan dari posisi berenti dan tiba2 jalan sendiri.

[Risol1]

Bro, kenapa cruise control dibatasi max 100 kpj, ya belajar dari kasus Mr Audi itu. Kalau sekarang dibilang Audi nggak ada apa2, juga bagi saya nggak masalah krn problem solved. Terima kasih kepada insinyur2 VW yang sangat bertanggung jawab.

Ane belon pernah denger kalo cruise control dibatesin sampe 100kpj aja. Mobil camry jadul ane aja bisa diset ke 130kpj cruise controlnya dan masih bisa nambah lagi.

[maskopat]

bagus lah kalo gitu... trus, sampe sekarang, sudah berapa mobil yang direcall? apakah masih kejadian masalah ini pada mobil2 yang sudah direcall?

trus, gimana tentang korban yang meninggal? belum ada tindak lanjutnya?

Yah bos... ane gak tau lah udah berapa mobil yg di recall.
Toyota udah lakukan tugasnya yaitu mengumumkan model mobil yg direcall (jenis, tahun pembuatan, VIN, dll). Pengumuman juga udah dimumkan dimana2: di national tv, koran2, website resmi, radio, surat dari dealer, dll....

Nah tinggal si konsumen sendiri yg memutuskan mao engga bawa mobilnya ke dealer buat diperbaiki. Bbrp minggu yg lalu sih kalo ane pas lewatin dealer toyota itu memang penuh berjejer sama mobil2 yg kena recall (camry, corolla, highlander, dkk.....). Pokoknya komitmen toyota itu konsumen engga ada yg ditolak cuma karena faktor jam operasi dealer, artinya selama konsumen mao nunggu, itu mobil biasanya pasti di benerin engga perduli sampe jam berapa mekanik2 toyota itu harus lembur.

Jadi sekarang jawaban ttg "berapa mobil yg udah direcall?" udah tergantung dari "Berapa banyak konsumen yg udah bawa mobilnya ke dealer?" karena kalo dari pihak toyota, mereka pasti terima dengan tangan terbuka kalo ada konsumen yg dateng

Kalo ttg santunan buat yg meninggal, yah sama aja kasusnya kalo ada orang mati dan katanya gara2 keracunan tel botol sosro
Yg pasti sih diselidiki dulu apakah bener teh botol sosro mengandung racun, kalo engga ya pasti disangkal lah sama produsen sosro. Kalo iya, ya pasti ada santunan lah.

Begitu juga dengan toyota. Kalo memang mati gara2 defect mobil, pasti ada settlement dari toyota. Tapi sekarang ini banyaknya orang2 yg mao mengambil kesempatan aja. Nabrak gara2 meleng tapi bilangnya mobilnya ngegas sendiri

Bayangin aja 3 bulan lalu adem2 aja, sekarang tiba2 ada 2-3 kasus masuk media per hari ttg Toyota yg ngegas sendiri Kan itu namanya ada orang2 yg nyari kesempatan aje......

trus, gimana tanggapan toyota terhadap yang bilang kalo toyota baru recall setelah "rusuh" di media massa? kenapa waktu ada yang complain sebelumnya toyota tidak melakukan penyelidikan terhadap mobilnya sehingga waktu recall bisa lebih cepat?

kalo ane gak salah inget, komplain ini sudah ada dari 1-2 tahun yang lalu... apakah dengan begini bisa dibilang response yang dilakukan oleh toyota sangat lambat? atau mungkin pada saat user komplain toyota tidak peduli dengan keluhan pengguna, karena mungkin lagi toyota merasa mobil bikininan dia sangat perfect.. toh tetap aja laku..

mohon pencerahan om...

[Risol1]

Pelajaran buat toyota , jangan terlalu banyak memproduksi mobil , hingga menyebabkan mobil amerika kalah bersaing sehingga tidak laku dan membuat pemerintah memutar otak atau taktik .

tentang mobil toyota saya rasa kualitas cukup mumpuni untuk pasar amerika walaupun mereka pelan tapi pasti MENGGEROGOTI pasar mobil2 amerika dari produsen lokal .

Belum tentu lah itu yg terjadi. Itu semua kan cuma teori.
Peristiwa 9/11 aja yg udah jelas2 itu tower dihajar sama pesawat, tapi masih ada yg bilang bahwa sebenernya itu dihantem sama rudalnya US sendiri

Intinya sih kalo cuma mao jatohin pamor mobil2 import, pemerintah US bisa lakukan dengan cara yg lebih elegan, bukan dengan gaya begini.
Kemaren2 program "Cash for Clunkers" aja yg jadi juara si atoyot (paling banyak jual mobil dengan disubsidi sama US govt). Kalo memang mao jegal mobil import, batesin aja program cash for clunkers cuma buat mobil2 domestic....kan bisa?
Atau seperti kebanyakan negara2 lain, naikkin aja pajak mobil2 import....mati deh pasti tu sales mobil2 import pada turun drastis

Juga yg namanya kongress US itu mewakili konstituen daerahnya masing2, misalnya senator A atau kongressman B dari state/distrik di state Kentucky punya kepentingan untuk mewakili/membela kepentingan orang2/perusahaan yg ada di kentucky, termasuk pabrik mobil mobil toyota di Kentucky.
begitu juga dengan kongress dari state mississippi yg pasti belain pabrikan nissan, begitu juga dengan Alabama dengan Honda dan Mercedesnya.......

Jadi di Kongress itu ada bermacam2 senator/Congressman yg mewakili daerahnya masing2, mereka bukan cuma mewakili USA melawan negara lain

Jadi kalo misalnya senator dan congressman Kentucky engga belain Toyota, sehingga pabrik toyota ditutup dan banyak warga kentucky jadi nganggur, maka itu senator besok2 bisa engga dipilih lagi sama rakyatnya karena udah membuat state mereka jadi "miskin"....gitu lho.
Jadi Senator/Congressman itu bukannya membela produk2 USA....mereka membela kepentingan daerahnya masing2.

YG belain GM/Domestic produk juga pasti ada, tapi mereka2 pasti dateng dari negara2 bagian yg GM heavy kaya Michigan, dll....
Jadi engga bisa seenaknya ada konspirasi dari US Govt untuk jatohin Toyota

[Risol1]

trus, gimana tanggapan toyota terhadap yang bilang kalo toyota baru recall setelah "rusuh" di media massa? kenapa waktu ada yang complain sebelumnya toyota tidak melakukan penyelidikan terhadap mobilnya sehingga waktu recall bisa lebih cepat?

kalo ane gak salah inget, komplain ini sudah ada dari 1-2 tahun yang lalu... apakah dengan begini bisa dibilang response yang dilakukan oleh toyota sangat lambat? atau mungkin pada saat user komplain toyota tidak peduli dengan keluhan pengguna, karena mungkin lagi toyota merasa mobil bikininan dia sangat perfect.. toh tetap aja laku..

mohon pencerahan om...

Wah ane juga bukan propesor di bidang2 beginian, ini dari pendapat ane aje nih ya:

Pertama2 ane cuma mao ingetin aja bahwa toyota itu sama aja kaya pabrik2 mobil besar lainnya yg punya birokrasi berbelit layaknya sebuah perusahaan besar. Jadi memang mungkin aja kasus ini udah terdeteksi 1-2 tahun ke belakang, tapi tetep ada 2 kemungkinan dalam kasus ini:
1. Yg namanya company gede, pada saat customer komplain sampe ada action secara company-wise, pasti ada step2 yg harus dia lewatin yg biasanya cukup makan waktu, gak mungkin proses klaim selesai dalam waktu semalam apalagi melibatkan recall berjuta2 mobil. Ibaratnya abis customer complain, itu filenya dipelajari dulu dan di file kan ke dept A, dept A lalu riset2 dan kalo casenya bisa diterusin lalu dikasi ke dept B, dst.....sampe ada keputusan final dari corporate bahwa mobil harus mereka recall karena defect dari pihak mereka (pabrikan).
Makanya kalo kita liat banyak pabrikan mobil2 lain (diluar toyota) yg nge-recall mobil2 lamanya (bukan mobil2 barunya lho) karena proses yg panjang ini.
2. Memang toyotanya yg ngumpet2 engga mao benerin defectnya sendiri: Ini juga mungkin aja terjadi karena ada indikasi bahwa petinggi toyota kasi surat edaran (internal memo) yg isinya mereka harus "tutup mata".

Ane rasa sih kasus recall besar2an toyota ini adalah kombinasi dari kedua sebab diatas.

TAPIiii, sekali lagi ane ingetin bahwa pabrikan lain juga engga lebih baik dari toyota ini, semua sama aja. Kalo kita obok2 internalnya si Honda, si Ford, si GM, si Mitsu, si Benz, si BMW, si Nissan......pasti ada aja "internal memo2" spt diatas, atau pasti ada aja kasus2 pengaduan konsumen ttg defective produknya yg udah difile dari 1-2 tahun yg lalu dan sampe sekarang masih dipelajari.

Tau darimana Sol??
Buktinya sehabis toyota kena kasus yg mencemarkan nama baiknya, berbondong2lah semua pabrikan lain untuk merecall produk2nya (ada produk yg lama, ada jg produk yg baru). Honda recall ratusan ribu mobil, mitsu dan nissan juga puluhan atau ratusan ribu....Ford juga.....
3 bulan yg lalu koq engga ada yg pada recall ya? Apakah semua defect2 yg ada di Honda, Nissan, Ford, Mitsu tsb baru ketauan within 3 bulan yg lalu? Kan engga......
Mereka cuma takut aja nasibnya sama kaya si atoyot yg ancur2an imagenya gara2 recall ini.

Jadi engga bener juga kalo kita menganggap cuma si atoyot doang yg "busuk", sedangkan produsen lain berhati mulia gara2 mereka ketakutan recall produk2nya sebelum di blow up sama media

Masalah2 recall kaya gini mah tinggal nunggu giliran aja, sekarang toyota.....besok2 yg kena pabrikan lain, Ford udah kena kemaren2 gara2 kasus pecah ban dll....

Kalo ada yg nanya lagi: Koq sekarang reaksi toyota bisa cepet setelah dibongkar oleh media?
Ya jawabannya sama lagi....karena perusahaan gede takut sama yg namanya public opinion yg bisa menghancurkan reputasinya. Makanya pada saat kasusnya masuk ke media, baru deh si toyota expedite semuanya dan bos2nya pun pada langsung turun tangan (makanya keputusan recall bisa cepet keluarnya).....ya SAMA lah dengan perusahaan mobil yg lain.

[FortunerMan]

ujiannya udah kelar belum nih.....kok belum ada undangan makan2nya?

Mungkin perlu juga makan2 untuk ini - Best selling car in America, 12 straight years, wins Motor Trend Comparison test... http://www.motortrend.com/roadtests/sed ... index.html

1. Toyota Camry 2. Ford Fusion 3. Hyundai Sonata...

Korban recall, udah tua, banyak saingan baru...eh, masih punya gigi ternyata

[maskopat]

Wah ane juga bukan propesor di bidang2 beginian, ini dari pendapat ane aje nih ya:

Pertama2 ane cuma mao ingetin aja bahwa toyota itu sama aja kaya pabrik2 mobil besar lainnya yg punya birokrasi berbelit layaknya sebuah perusahaan besar. Jadi memang mungkin aja kasus ini udah terdeteksi 1-2 tahun ke belakang, tapi tetep ada 2 kemungkinan dalam kasus ini:
1. Yg namanya company gede, pada saat customer komplain sampe ada action secara company-wise, pasti ada step2 yg harus dia lewatin yg biasanya cukup makan waktu, gak mungkin proses klaim selesai dalam waktu semalam apalagi melibatkan recall berjuta2 mobil. Ibaratnya abis customer complain, itu filenya dipelajari dulu dan di file kan ke dept A, dept A lalu riset2 dan kalo casenya bisa diterusin lalu dikasi ke dept B, dst.....sampe ada keputusan final dari corporate bahwa mobil harus mereka recall karena defect dari pihak mereka (pabrikan).
Makanya kalo kita liat banyak pabrikan mobil2 lain (diluar toyota) yg nge-recall mobil2 lamanya (bukan mobil2 barunya lho) karena proses yg panjang ini.
2. Memang toyotanya yg ngumpet2 engga mao benerin defectnya sendiri: Ini juga mungkin aja terjadi karena ada indikasi bahwa petinggi toyota kasi surat edaran (internal memo) yg isinya mereka harus "tutup mata".

Ane rasa sih kasus recall besar2an toyota ini adalah kombinasi dari kedua sebab diatas.

TAPIiii, sekali lagi ane ingetin bahwa pabrikan lain juga engga lebih baik dari toyota ini, semua sama aja. Kalo kita obok2 internalnya si Honda, si Ford, si GM, si Mitsu, si Benz, si BMW, si Nissan......pasti ada aja "internal memo2" spt diatas, atau pasti ada aja kasus2 pengaduan konsumen ttg defective produknya yg udah difile dari 1-2 tahun yg lalu dan sampe sekarang masih dipelajari.

Tau darimana Sol??
Buktinya sehabis toyota kena kasus yg mencemarkan nama baiknya, berbondong2lah semua pabrikan lain untuk merecall produk2nya (ada produk yg lama, ada jg produk yg baru). Honda recall ratusan ribu mobil, mitsu dan nissan juga puluhan atau ratusan ribu....Ford juga.....
3 bulan yg lalu koq engga ada yg pada recall ya? Apakah semua defect2 yg ada di Honda, Nissan, Ford, Mitsu tsb baru ketauan within 3 bulan yg lalu? Kan engga......
Mereka cuma takut aja nasibnya sama kaya si atoyot yg ancur2an imagenya gara2 recall ini.

Jadi engga bener juga kalo kita menganggap cuma si atoyot doang yg "busuk", sedangkan produsen lain berhati mulia gara2 mereka ketakutan recall produk2nya sebelum di blow up sama media

Masalah2 recall kaya gini mah tinggal nunggu giliran aja, sekarang toyota.....besok2 yg kena pabrikan lain, Ford udah kena kemaren2 gara2 kasus pecah ban dll....

Kalo ada yg nanya lagi: Koq sekarang reaksi toyota bisa cepet setelah dibongkar oleh media?
Ya jawabannya sama lagi....karena perusahaan gede takut sama yg namanya public opinion yg bisa menghancurkan reputasinya. Makanya pada saat kasusnya masuk ke media, baru deh si toyota expedite semuanya dan bos2nya pun pada langsung turun tangan (makanya keputusan recall bisa cepet keluarnya).....ya SAMA lah dengan perusahaan mobil yg lain.

ane setuju om.. yang lain latah ikutan recall takut "ketahuan" di poin 2 yang om sebut.. kupret emang ya orang2 yang kayak gitu...
asal jangan seperti mitsu aja, yang nutupin malah anak buahnya... halah..

nanya lagi nih, emangnya badan transportasi nasional negara mana gitu, boleh gak sih "ngobok2" hal2 yang semacam ini? jadi mereka memberikan layanan komplain kalo komplain ke ATPM gak ditanggapi, selanjutnya badan ini akan melakukan investiasi secara menyeluruh. emang sih, biayanya jadi tinggi.. tapi kalo ternyata dari hasil investigasi ini terbukti, ATPM akan dikenakan denda atau hukuman lain karena telah "mengabaikan" komplain dari pengguna...
yah, intinya adalah memberikan keselamatan, kenyamanan bagi konsumen..

di amrik yang hukumnya lebih baik daripada indonesia aja kayak gitu.. apalagi negara ane nih...

[asudarsono]

Bro, kenapa cruise control dibatasi max 100 kpj, ya belajar dari kasus Mr Audi itu. Kalau sekarang dibilang Audi nggak ada apa2, juga bagi saya nggak masalah krn problem solved. Terima kasih kepada insinyur2 VW yang sangat bertanggung jawab.

Ane belon pernah denger kalo cruise control dibatesin sampe 100kpj aja. Mobil camry jadul ane aja bisa diset ke 130kpj cruise controlnya dan masih bisa nambah lagi.

Busyet, Toyota bisa ya? Gak melanggar hukum?

[toyotaman]

http://www.nutwooduk.co.uk/downloads/Toyota.doc

[mandala1]

amrik yang hukumnya lebih baik daripada indonesia aja kayak gitu.. apalagi negara ane nih...

Waaah....ane baru tau kalo om kopat ternyata bule juga...emang tinggal di negara mana om?

[toyotaman]

http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/co ... op+stories


The Humbling of Toyota
A combination of high-speed global growth and ambitious cost cuts led to the quality lapses that have tarnished the once-mighty brand. How it all went wrong


Toyota Motor has always been fanatical about frugality, and for many years that was good for both the company and its customers. This is a Japanese carmaker that routinely turned down the heat at its employee dormitories during working hours and labeled photocopy machines with the cost per copy to discourage overuse. Its engineers collaborated with suppliers to extract cost-savings without compromising quality. Yet by the middle of the last decade Toyota's virtue had become a vice.


So say current and former auto executives who are trying to grasp how Toyota, with its gold-plated reputation for engineering excellence, slipped up on such a scale, with 8 million cars recalled due to mechanical failures linked by U.S. regulators to 51 deaths. Before company officials knew that runaway acceleration was causing crashes, one of these executives says, a simple manufacturing process would sometimes ignite small fires in a component as a direct result of corner-cutting. It was just one early sign that the focus on cost reduction had gone too far.


Those production mishaps occurred in 2006, a year after company President Katsuaki Watanabe boasted about having squeezed more than $10 billion from global operating costs in the previous six years—this despite an impressive run of profit growth and global market share gains in the middle of the last decade. Then Toyota pushed even harder for more cuts. It asked suppliers to design parts for its Camry midsize sedan that were 10% cheaper and 10% lighter. The company's top U.S. executive, Jim Press, warned his bosses in Japan that vehicle quality was slipping, according to a slide presentation U.S. Senate investigators unearthed in their sudden-acceleration probe. But his warning had no apparent effect.


The redesigned Camry brought out in 2006 had an embarrassing flaw in its headliner, the fabric and composite lining that covers the inside roof of the car. Under pressure to cut costs, the lead Camry supplier, Toyota-affiliated Toyota Boshoku, chose a carbon fiber material that hadn't been approved by Toyota engineers, according to an executive who worked on the redesign. The headliner is made by compressing layers of materials together using a certain amount of heat to mold it. In this case, the carbon fiber required so much heat that the headliner would catch fire.


Toyota fixed that problem, but when a North American parts supplier interested in working with the automaker did a teardown of a 2007 Camry, its engineers were surprised by how much the traditional Toyota craftsmanship had been watered down by years of nips and tucks. The padding in the ceiling of the car, though compliant with safety regulations, had been thinned out to save money. A tray for sunglasses used a flimsier type of plastic than previous models. "It was a bare-bones car at that point," says one executive who declined to be identified for fear of harming business ties with Toyota.


Toyota insists its focus on cost hasn't hurt consumers. "It's not true that by reducing cost you automatically reduce quality," said Jim Wiseman, Toyota's vice-president for North American corporate communications. "Every automaker has to stay competitive relative to price."


True, but probably not with the intensity Toyota brought to cost-cutting and rapid expansion under three successive presidents: Hiroshi Okuda (1995-1999), Fujio Cho (1999-2005), and Watanabe (2005 to 2009). Toyota executives will spend years mopping up after their mess.


At last count, the company faced 109 class actions and 32 individual cases filed in courts in the U.S. and Canada. (In a well-publicized incident on Mar. 8, the owner of a 2008 Prius lost control of his car on a California interstate highway and had to be rescued by police.)


As grave as the current troubles are, they are symptomatic of a larger problem at Toyota: It got carried away chasing high-speed growth, market share, and productivity gains year in and year out. All that slowly dulled the commitment to quality embedded in Toyota's corporate culture.


"The root cause of their problems is that the company was hijacked, some years ago, by anti-[Toyoda] family, financially oriented pirates," Press charged in a recent interview with Bloomberg News. Once the highest-ranking American at the company, with a seat on the board of directors, Press left in 2007 to join Chrysler as vice-chairman and president, but departed from there after last year's bankruptcy. The financial pirates, he said, "didn't have the character necessary to maintain a customer-first focus."


The embodiment of character at Toyota, as any new engineering hire there learns, is a man named Taiichi Ohno, the innovator widely credited as the genius behind the Toyota Production System. With a handful of other executives during the 1950s, Ohno developed a set of in-house precepts on carmaking efficiency that later evolved into such concepts as lean manufacturing and just-in-time inventory management. Ohno's ideas not only changed the auto industry, they changed late-20th-century manufacturing. At their core was an attention to detail and a noble frugality that shunned waste of every kind. As Ohno's concepts were handed down to successive generations of Toyota executives, however, the purity of the message appears to have been slowly lost.


The traditions of the company began to change in 1995 when family elders, led by then-Chairman Shoichiro Toyoda, tapped Okuda to take over the company from 68-year-old Tatsuro Toyoda, who had been waylaid by a stroke. The company was widely thought to have lost its edge, and Okuda (a black belt in judo) was just the sort of hard-charger to help get it back.


In jobs ranging from accounting and purchasing to international and domestic sales, he was a nonstop manager who liked to test-drive every Toyota under development. He also could be impolitic. In 1995, Okuda called his Detroit rivals "stupid" for trying to import bulky cars ill suited to Japan's narrow side streets.


Toyota needed Okuda's in-your-face approach. Glacial decision-making and poor execution were resulting in major mistakes. Toyota stuck with conservatively styled sedans when everybody in the U.S. and Japan wanted the more daring, off-road stuff. It also botched some key product launches. It introduced the T100 truck in the U.S. with an underpowered engine, and a 1995 redesign of the Corolla for the Japanese market fell flat.


Okuda and his team started turning things around on the product front while embarking on one of the most aggressive overseas expansions in automotive history. Between 1995 and the end of 2009, Toyota roughly doubled, to 50, the number of overseas plants and manufacturing facilities in North America, Asia, and Europe in a bid to improve its market responsiveness and sidestep potential trade disputes about car exports from Japan. This coincided with a massive product rollout that penetrated new categories ranging from the boxy Scion xB to the one-ton Tundra pickup to the hybrid Prius compact. In the U.S., Toyota gained market share at "a kind of speed no other carmaker has ever experienced in the past," said Koji Endo, an analyst with Advanced Research Japan in Tokyo.


By the late 1990s the Corolla sedan and the 4Runner and RAV4 sport-utility offerings were all selling well, and plans were under way to invade Detroit's cash-cow minivan and large pickup truck categories. In the all-important North American market, Okuda spent big to double total vehicle capacity, to 1.2 million units, by 1998. To launch the Sienna minivan, he expanded capacity at Toyota's Georgetown (Ky.) plant, already the production base for its Camry and Avalon sedans.


Early in Okuda's tenure as president there was a lot of talk about grabbing a 10% share of the global auto market. By the time he moved up to the chairman's job in 1999 to make way for Cho, the goal was 15%. Cho was less flamboyant than Okuda and studied law at the prestigious University of Tokyo. Yet early in his career Cho became fascinated with the Toyota Production System and mastered its best practices. (He put that knowledge to use in 1988, supervising the launch of the Georgetown plant.) Cho often talked about the "criticality of speed" in product development cycles and the importance of responding to changes in the marketplace. Ohno's precepts were beginning to morph into something he might not have recognized.


By 2003 a lot of things were going right at Toyota. Profits were booming, and in November of that year it enjoyed a market capitalization of $110 billion—more than that of GM, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler combined. (Today, despite its troubles, Toyota is valued at $132 billion.) In the U.S. it had finally pieced together a strong lineup of high-margin SUVs, once the profit sanctuary of U.S. automakers, ranging from the $19,000 RAV4 to the $65,000 Lexus LX470. Meanwhile, the Prius was starting to take off, creating mass market interest in eco-friendly cars.


At the same time, Cho, Okuda, and other top executives were pushing ahead with a program dubbed CCC21 ("Construction of Cost Competitiveness for the 21st Century") that had been started in 1998. In implementing CCC21, no detail was too small. For instance, Toyota designers took a close look at the grip handles mounted above the door inside most cars. By working with suppliers they managed to cut the number of parts to five from 34, which helped cut procurement costs by 40%. The change slashed the time needed for installation by 75%—to three seconds. "The pressure is on to cut costs at every stage," Takashi Araki, a project manager at parts maker and Toyota affiliate Aisin Seiki, told BusinessWeek at the time.


By mid-decade, when Watanabe, a trained economist, became president, Toyota had incredible numbers to share with Wall Street analysts. On the job as Toyota's chief executive for less than three months, Watanabe told New York's financial community at a Sept. 12, 2005, meeting in Manhattan that CCC21 had wrung out more than $10 billion in savings over six years. "Under CCC21 activities, which I led, Toyota realized cost reductions of more than 200 billion yen ($2.2 billion) a year on a consolidated basis," he said.


It wasn't enough. Next up was what he called an "aggressive version of CCC21," dubbed Value Innovation, which promised more savings by making the entire development process cheaper and faster, further trimming parts, production costs, and time to market. Toyota had managed to slash the time it took to bring models into production once a design was final to about 12 months, compared with an industry average of between 24 and 36 months.


A credit bubble and soaring home prices in the U.S. had Americans buying Camrys and Lexus SUVs in droves. Toyota raked in $55 billion in operating income during its fiscal years running from 2006 to 2008. Shares traded in Tokyo (Toyota also has stock listed in New York and London) shot up 112% from mid-2005 to February of 2007.


Yet during these hyperspeed growth years there were signs of trouble. That's when Press, Toyota Motor's top U.S. executive, warned his bosses that quality was slipping and that regulators were stepping up scrutiny.


Reports of more serious problems started to get the attention of U.S. regulators far earlier in the decade. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration opened eight investigations of unintended acceleration of Toyota vehicles from 2003 to 2010, according to Safety Research & Strategies, a Rehoboth (Mass.) group that gathers data from NHTSA and other sources for plaintiff's attorneys and consumers, though the carmaker's problems only became widely known to the public this year.


Toyota's fortunes, and that of the entire industry, took a nasty turn starting in late 2007 as the financial crisis hit and oil prices spiked to $145 per barrel in July of 2008—a combination that brought on the global recession that later pushed GM and Chrysler into bankruptcy. Last September, at a meeting with Toyota investors in Tokyo, Akio Toyoda, who succeeded Watanabe in June 2009, said an annual goal had been to boost global sales by as many as 700,000 vehicles a year, more than three times the previous increase, according to a former executive who attended the gathering. The accelerated production had outstripped the abilities of company engineers and led Toyota to outsource more development work to suppliers.


On Feb. 24 of this year, the grandson of company founder Kiichiro Toyoda said during testimony before a congressional committee: "I fear the pace at which we have grown may have been too quick....Priorities became confused, and we were not able to stop, think, and make improvements as much as we were able to before."


Toyoda and other top executives have vowed to fix the sudden-acceleration problems and other quality lapses that have surfaced in so many of its models. In a bid to win back customers, Toyota is offering incentives such as no-interest loans and discounted leases, which may reignite sales. Still, Toyoda and his team will be spending many months trying to absorb a painful lesson about what happens to a great company when ambition gets too far ahead of tradition.


With David Welch, Margaret Cronin Fisk, and Doron Levin in Southfield, and Ian Rowley, Makiko Kitamura, and Yuki Hagiwara in Tokyo

[maskopat]

amrik yang hukumnya lebih baik daripada indonesia aja kayak gitu.. apalagi negara ane nih...

Waaah....ane baru tau kalo om kopat ternyata bule juga...emang tinggal di negara mana om?

ane mah bule kecelup om...

[toyotaman]

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/busin ... gewanted=1

Toyota Sees Growing Anger From Suppliers in Japan

Published: February 23, 2010

KARIYA, Japan — As Toyota’s president Akio Toyoda faces American lawmakers on Wednesday, his company will be facing something else here in Japan’s auto manufacturing heartland: an unprecedented level of opprobrium.


Osamu Miura, laid off by Toyota, with leaflets and a sign asking to be allowed to work.
Come what may, Toyota used to be able to count on a reflexive loyalty in this small city, where the rows of smoke stacks and metal-roofed factories rise like something out of Dickens. But after years of feeling the sting of Toyota’s cost-cutting, some of the workers and suppliers that used to be the company’s biggest cheerleaders are instead experiencing a sense of grim pleasure over the company’s woes.


The change is rooted in the changing behavior of Japanese corporations. Communities like Kariya that once enjoyed a near familial relationship with Toyota, have been feeling forsaken for years as this country’s social contract has changed.


While employment is still for life for Toyota’s full-time workers, some complain that the company is now miserly with wage increases. Over time it has steadily reduced the ranks of its short-term contractors and pressured its suppliers to decrease prices.


For decades, thousands of tiny auto parts companies like Sankyo Seiko were Toyota’s loyal legions, and toiled in relative obscurity to supply the behemoth. But the auto giant’s demands in recent years for ever lower prices have driven many of these companies out of business.


After successive price cuts, Toyota now pays them about 30 percent less for the same part than it did a decade ago, despite the higher cost of raw materials like steel, many companies say.


“Toyota just squeezes us, like it’s trying to wring water from a dry towel,” said Masayuki Nishioka, 49, whose factory in Kariya makes the rubber seals for Toyota’s car windows.


Last month something snapped for Sankyo’s owner, Teruo Moewaki. He appeared on local television to do the unthinkable: criticize Toyota, announcing that he would no longer accept orders from the automaker or its affiliates.


“I said on TV what they all want to say, but are afraid to,” said Mr. Moewaki, 60, standing in the dark one-room workshop where he and his three employees operate gritty machines. “Toyota said we were all one big family. But now they are betraying us.”


The outburst turned Mr. Moewaki into an instant local celebrity. But he is not the only one speaking out.


To hear many here tell it, in good times Toyota failed to increase wages for employees and forced painful price cuts on parts suppliers even as it earned record profits. Since the global downturn, these critics say, Toyota has released thousands of contract workers and squeezed parts makers even further.


While this may seem like normal, even prudent, management, many in Japan see it as an act of betrayal. In fact, Toyota has become a symbol here of how corporate Japan has begun to violate the nation’s unspoken postwar social contract, in which big paternalistic companies share the wealth with employees and business partners in good times and help them weather the bad.


“Toyota is attacked so much because it has become the face of corporate Japan,” said Hisao Inoue, the author of two books on Toyota. “All Japan’s social problems, economic problems, political problems all seem to pile up on Toyota.”


Mr. Inoue said the criticism can be unfair, and is part of a broader reaction here against globalization and the embrace of American-style competition under former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Still, some dozen books have been published in the last five years, with titles like “The Dark Side of Toyota” and “The Toyota You Don’t Know.”


Even through the early 1990s economic collapse, as big companies squeezed costs or shifted production overseas to compete with lower-price rivals from South Korea and China, this manufacturing belt around the central city of Nagoya, an area known as the Detroit of Japan, seemed immune. Toyota continued to grow even as Japan stumbled in other industries, like consumer electronics.


Now there is a palpable sense of alarm in the air. Cities like Kariya appear to be turning into a new rust belt of abandoned industrial neighborhoods, with economists estimating the number of small manufacturers in this part of Japan has dropped by half in the last two decades to about 180,000. Unemployment has also taken off in Aichi prefecture, where Nagoya is located, doubling to 4.5 percent last year from the year before.


One of the newly jobless is Osamu Miura, who worked for two years monitoring quality control at a sprawling plant making Prius hybrids in nearby Toyota City, where the automaker is based. Two months ago, the company said it would not renew his contract, making him one of thousands in that category after the global financial crisis began.


But unlike most of the others, Mr. Miura has refused to go quietly. Every day, he has donned his immaculate company uniform and Toyota cap to report for work at the factory gate, where he is invariably turned away. On a recent rainy afternoon, a half-dozen current and former Toyota employees, members of a small labor union, joined him in front of the gate to hand out fliers to passing workers.


“Toyota is going in the wrong direction, and so is Japan,” said Mr. Miura, 40, who taped a blue placard to his chest that said, “Let me work!”


“Standing up against Toyota is still a taboo,” said Hiroshi Oba, 56, a Toyota employee at the Prius plant who said he was putting his chances for promotion at risk by standing with Mr. Miura, “but these job cuts are a social problem that we cannot ignore.”


Paul Nolasco, a spokesman for Toyota, said the company was aware of such criticisms, but called them one-sided. He said that while the number of contract workers had fallen to 2,300 early this year, from 10,000 before the Lehman Brothers crisis in September 2008, some 900 contract workers have been given full-time jobs since 2008.


It is also hard to gauge the full extent of anger at Toyota. Japan’s establishment media have been restrained in their criticism even during the recalls for fear of angering the company, the nation’s largest advertiser. Toyota critics here say the community still frowns on criticism of the region’s largest employer, making many afraid to speak out.


But that is changing, too. Saichi Kurematsu, chairman of the Airoren, a federation of labor unions in Aichi prefecture, said that complaints once limited to the far left are entering the mainstream. He said attendance at his federation’s rallies against Toyota has jumped sevenfold since 2003, the local media now write about his activities and even small company owners, once antiunion, welcome his criticisms of Toyota.


“There has been a dramatic change in how people view Toyota,” Mr. Kurematsu said.


Mr. Moewaki, the factory owner who spoke out on TV, said small companies are moving out of the auto industry to survive.


“Toyota just fills its own pockets now,” Mr. Moewaki said. “It is already clear that we cannot rely on Toyota anymore.”

[Captivated]

Mungkin perlu juga makan2 untuk ini - Best selling car in America, 12 straight years, wins Motor Trend Comparison test... http://www.motortrend.com/roadtests/sed ... index.html

1. Toyota Camry 2. Ford Fusion 3. Hyundai Sonata...

Korban recall, udah tua, banyak saingan baru...eh, masih punya gigi ternyata

klo gw baca, camry mmg best selling 12x tp kyknya bukan berturut2
cmiiw... soalnya gw cupu bhs asing

msh dr link diatas....

The bigger issue is Toyota's image problem. The PR spin and response have been unimpressive, and the revelation that Toyota hired ex-NHTSA guys to help close five of eight NHTSA sudden-accel investigations since 2003 hasn't helped. Then there are the subpoenaed documents that have yet to be digested, which Toyota whistle-blower Dimitrios Biller says will prove the company systematically hid and destroyed evidence of safety problems. Things will probably get worse before they get better. Meanwhile resale values have taken a hit of between four and six percent, according to Kelly Blue Book, and some experts think that could go to 10 percent before this is over. Present ALG data indicates our Camry LE's residual values ranked fifth in this test, just above the domestics.

[toyotaman]

http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/379 ... ota_prius/

The Dark Side of the Toyota Prius
By Paul Abowd

A new report alleges that Toyota, the world's largest auto company, is violating workers' rights at Prius hybrid plants in Japan.


In its 65-page report released in June, NLC includes first-hand testimony of factory conditions in “Toyota City,” outside of Nagoya, Japan — less than 200 miles southwest of Tokyo — where the largest auto company in the world employs some 70,000 people.


The report alleges that Toyota exploits guest workers, mostly shipped in from China and Vietnam. According to the NLC, these workers are “stripped of their passports and often forced to work — including at subcontract plants supplying Toyota — 16 hours a day, seven days a week, while being paid less than half the legal minimum wage.” Workers are forced to live in company dormitories and deported for complaining about poor treatment, the report finds.


Low-wage temporary workers make up one-third of Toyota’s Prius assembly-line workers, mostly in the auto-parts supply chain. They are signed to contracts for periods as short as four months, and are paid only 60 percent of a full-time employee’s wage.


Parts plants run by subcontractors advertise standard, nine-hour, five-day-a-week jobs. But according to the NLC, “the typical shift was 15 to 16.5 hours a day, from 8:30 a.m. to 11:30 p.m. or 1:00 a.m.”


In 2002, Kenichi Uchino, 30, died while working at the “green” Tsutsumi plant that assembles the Prius. During the 13th hour of a routine 14-hour day, Uchino collapsed on the shop floor of the internationally lauded “sustainable” factory, which uses sulfur-oxide-eating paint and boasts 5 percent emissions reductions. A Japanese court ruled that Uchino’s death was caused by exhaustion from overwork.


His wife, Hiroko Uchino, described a grueling lifestyle that included an 85-hour workweek prior to his death. The NLC published his time cards, which reveal that he was “putting in 106.5 to 155 hours of overtime … in the 30 days leading up to his death.”


Much of this overtime went unpaid. (Toyota explained Kenichi’s extra hours as “voluntary quality control activities,” says the report.) But in court, his survivors were able to win pension payments.


The NLC also alleges that Toyota — through its subsidiary Toyota Tsusho — has joint business ventures with Burma’s military regime. The charges arise from an agreement between Tsusho, Suzuki and the junta to set up parts and material plants in Burma, and produce vehicles for the military government. These ties remain despite a 2001 declaration from the company that it ended contracts with the Burmese government.


In the wake of the report, the company wrote a letter to stockholders: “Toyota has carefully considered the current environment in Burma, has conveyed to Toyota Tsusho Corporation its concerns about that environment, and has asked Toyota Tsusho to reconsider its business activities in the country.” As the largest owner of Tsusho’s stock (more than a third), Toyota itself has a role to play in cutting these ties.


The NLC report also connects the company’s overseas misdeeds to the American economy. Millions of dollars in car parts shipped by Toyota Tsusho are received by Tsusho America, which distributes them to Toyota assembly plants in the American South. This influx of foreign auto infrastructure uses an overwhelming ratio of non-union labor, fueling the diminution of union density in the auto sector.


What’s more, a memo leaked from Toyota’s Georgetown, Ky., plant to the New York Times in late 2007, exposed “management’s plans to cut $300 million in labor costs across Toyota’s North American operations over the next three years.” To do this, Toyota plans to introduce tiered wage scales and reduced health benefits for U.S. Toyota workers, which should come as little surprise to an American auto workforce that has suffered similar attacks from Detroit’s Big Three manufacturers for the past three decades.


As NLC Director Charles Kernaghan says, if Hollywood celebrities — such as actors Leonardo DiCaprio and Cameron Diaz — can popularize green driving, they can also help end Toyota’s sweatshop labor regime and its ties to Burma’s dictatorship.


Says Kernaghan: “We hope that these same celebrities will now also challenge Toyota to improve its respect for human and worker rights.”

[Captivated]

wah klo artikel diatas bener, parah juga ni Toyota

[FortunerMan]

Mungkin perlu juga makan2 untuk ini - Best selling car in America, 12 straight years, wins Motor Trend Comparison test... http://www.motortrend.com/roadtests/sed ... index.html

1. Toyota Camry 2. Ford Fusion 3. Hyundai Sonata...

Korban recall, udah tua, banyak saingan baru...eh, masih punya gigi ternyata

klo gw baca, camry mmg best selling 12x tp kyknya bukan berturut2
cmiiw... soalnya gw cupu bhs asing

msh dr link diatas....

The bigger issue is Toyota's image problem. The PR spin and response have been unimpressive, and the revelation that Toyota hired ex-NHTSA guys to help close five of eight NHTSA sudden-accel investigations since 2003 hasn't helped. Then there are the subpoenaed documents that have yet to be digested, which Toyota whistle-blower Dimitrios Biller says will prove the company systematically hid and destroyed evidence of safety problems. Things will probably get worse before they get better. Meanwhile resale values have taken a hit of between four and six percent, according to Kelly Blue Book, and some experts think that could go to 10 percent before this is over. Present ALG data indicates our Camry LE's residual values ranked fifth in this test, just above the domestics.

Maap ane salah baca...bukan 12 straight...tapi 12 kali...ganti2an sama Accord sebelum mengalahkan Taurus duluan. Yg jelas saingan ke depan Ford dan Hyundai sudah makin berat, tapi Camry tuir ini masih punya gigi. The next Camry bakalan lebih mantabsssssss...

Jelas aja image problem lagi di tengah recall Tapi dikasi diskon dikit yg beli masih berbondong bondong...