Kecelakaan pesawat lion air jakarta- pangkal pinang

[dizco]

Dari hasil baca baca di beberapa tulisan terkait grounded MAX fleet, ada beberapa testimoni yang menyatakan bahwa platform 737 sudah mentok di NG. Body yang melar + mesin lebih besar + platform 737 yang antik tapi terlalu dipaksakan jadi kombinasi yang sangat riskan untuk seri MAX dibanding generasi pendahulunya

Just take the info above with a (massive) grain of salt, never push a platform too far

[Pugman]

Dari hasil baca baca di beberapa tulisan terkait grounded MAX fleet, ada beberapa testimoni yang menyatakan bahwa platform 737 sudah mentok di NG. Body yang melar + mesin lebih besar + platform 737 yang antik tapi terlalu dipaksakan jadi kombinasi yang sangat riskan untuk seri MAX dibanding generasi pendahulunya

Just take the info above with a (massive) grain of salt, never push a platform too far

Bagaimana dengan Airbus 320neo series, apakah yang saat ini menggunakan platform baru?

[Turboman]

Dari hasil baca baca di beberapa tulisan terkait grounded MAX fleet, ada beberapa testimoni yang menyatakan bahwa platform 737 sudah mentok di NG. Body yang melar + mesin lebih besar + platform 737 yang antik tapi terlalu dipaksakan jadi kombinasi yang sangat riskan untuk seri MAX dibanding generasi pendahulunya

Just take the info above with a (massive) grain of salt, never push a platform too far

kayak babe nya FRD yg selalu memimpikan
- Agya 1VD-FTV

wik wik wik wik wik wik

[Turboman]

Dari hasil baca baca di beberapa tulisan terkait grounded MAX fleet, ada beberapa testimoni yang menyatakan bahwa platform 737 sudah mentok di NG. Body yang melar + mesin lebih besar + platform 737 yang antik tapi terlalu dipaksakan jadi kombinasi yang sangat riskan untuk seri MAX dibanding generasi pendahulunya

Just take the info above with a (massive) grain of salt, never push a platform too far

Bagaimana dengan Airbus 320neo series, apakah yang saat ini menggunakan platform baru?

kayaknya A320 mending krn sayapnya agak tinggi

737 sayapnya ceper

aslinya 737 pake mesin cerutu JT8D yg suaranya Resing banget itu.......

[Pugman]

Dari hasil baca baca di beberapa tulisan terkait grounded MAX fleet, ada beberapa testimoni yang menyatakan bahwa platform 737 sudah mentok di NG. Body yang melar + mesin lebih besar + platform 737 yang antik tapi terlalu dipaksakan jadi kombinasi yang sangat riskan untuk seri MAX dibanding generasi pendahulunya

Just take the info above with a (massive) grain of salt, never push a platform too far

Bagaimana dengan Airbus 320neo series, apakah yang saat ini menggunakan platform baru?

kayaknya A320 mending krn sayapnya agak tinggi

737 sayapnya ceper

aslinya 737 pake mesin cerutu JT8D yg suaranya Resing banget itu.......

JT8D itu turbofan atau Turbojet Om? Untuk 320Neo apakah ada yang pakai leap engine?

Jadi mungkin ini ceritanya Boeing mau ikutan Airbus pakai sistem Automation yang lebih kompleks ya..? Tapi masa transisinya tidak mulus.

Saya sering baca/dengar perbandingan kira2 seperti ini, kalau Airbus itu 80% computer automation dan 20% usaha pilot mengendalikan pesawat, sementara di Boeing mungkin Intervensi Automation Computer 50% dan 50% oleh pilot. Di Max series, Boeing berusaha meningkatkan kinerja komputasinya? Please correct if I'm wrong.

Kalau di Boeing seri apa yang punya sistem Automation sekompleks Airbus?

[grandis_GT]

Bagaimana dengan Airbus 320neo series, apakah yang saat ini menggunakan platform baru?

kayaknya A320 mending krn sayapnya agak tinggi

737 sayapnya ceper

aslinya 737 pake mesin cerutu JT8D yg suaranya Resing banget itu.......

JT8D itu turbofan atau Turbojet Om? Untuk 320Neo apakah ada yang pakai leap engine?

Jadi mungkin ini ceritanya Boeing mau ikutan Airbus pakai sistem Automation yang lebih kompleks ya..? Tapi masa transisinya tidak mulus.

Saya sering baca/dengar perbandingan kira2 seperti ini, kalau Airbus itu 80% computer automation dan 20% usaha pilot mengendalikan pesawat, sementara di Boeing mungkin Intervensi Automation Computer 50% dan 50% oleh pilot. Di Max series, Boeing berusaha meningkatkan kinerja komputasinya? Please correct if I'm wrong.

Kalau di Boeing seri apa yang punya sistem Automation sekompleks Airbus?

787 Dreamliner dan 777 X mungkin om

[Turboman]

Bagaimana dengan Airbus 320neo series, apakah yang saat ini menggunakan platform baru?

kayaknya A320 mending krn sayapnya agak tinggi

737 sayapnya ceper

aslinya 737 pake mesin cerutu JT8D yg suaranya Resing banget itu.......

JT8D itu turbofan atau Turbojet Om? Untuk 320Neo apakah ada yang pakai leap engine?

Jadi mungkin ini ceritanya Boeing mau ikutan Airbus pakai sistem Automation yang lebih kompleks ya..? Tapi masa transisinya tidak mulus.

Saya sering baca/dengar perbandingan kira2 seperti ini, kalau Airbus itu 80% computer automation dan 20% usaha pilot mengendalikan pesawat, sementara di Boeing mungkin Intervensi Automation Computer 50% dan 50% oleh pilot. Di Max series, Boeing berusaha meningkatkan kinerja komputasinya? Please correct if I'm wrong.

Kalau di Boeing seri apa yang punya sistem Automation sekompleks Airbus?

LEAP 1A = 320 Neo

1B = 747 MEK

1C = Comac 919

akakkaka

Kalo liat yutub nya om Gerry, jadi ADIRU Control unit nya Erbas bisa di non aktifkan, pesawat bisa terbang full manual

di 737 MEK ada kemungkinan ADIRU CU always on walau terbang manual

ADIRU CU = Control unit yg baca speed sensor / AOA......mirip kayak BCM di mobil yah yg baca speed sensor........cuman di wawat ADIRU CU lebih dr 1.......ada di kanan - kiri utk baca sensor2 di masing2 sisi wawat

CMIIW

[Salvanost]

Berit terbaru
kemungkinan kasusnya sama kaya Lion Air

Lah... Kalau sama kaya Lion Air gimana donk?
Salah pilot? Liat seberapa kuat lobby negara masing2?

[mr_mytplx]

menarik artikel ini.

The Best Analysis Of What Really Happened To The Boeing 737 Max From A Pilot & Software Engineer

1of x: BEST analysis of what really is happening on the #Boeing737Max issue from my brother in law @davekammeyer, who’s a pilot, software engineer & deep thinker. Bottom line don’t blame software that’s the band aid for many other engineering and economic forces in effect.🎖

Some people are calling the 737MAX tragedies a #software failure. Here's my response: It's not a software problem. It was an
* Economic problem that the 737 engines used too much fuel, so they decided to install more efficient engines with bigger fans and make the 737MAX.

This led to an
* Airframe problem. They wanted to use the 737 airframe for economic reasons, but needed more ground clearance with bigger engines.The 737 design can't be practically modified to have taller main landing gear. The solution was to mount them higher & more forward.

This led to an
* Aerodynamic problem. The airframe with the engines mounted differently did not have adequately stable handling at high AoA to be certifiable. Boeing decided to create the MCAS system to electronically correct for the aircraft's handling deficiencies.

During the course of developing the MCAS, there was a
* Systems engineering problem. Boeing wanted the simplest possible fix that fit their existing systems architecture, so that it required minimal engineering rework, and minimal new training for pilots and maintenance crews.

The easiest way to do this was to add some features to the existing Elevator Feel Shift system. Like the #EFS system, the #MCAS relies on non-redundant sensors to decide how much trim to add. Unlike the EFS system, MCAS can make huge nose down trim changes.

On both ill-fated flights, there was a:
* Sensor problem. The AoA vane on the 737MAX appears to not be very reliable and gave wildly wrong readings. On #LionAir, this was compounded by a

* Maintenance practices problem. The previous crew had experienced the same problem and didn't record the problem in the maintenance logbook. This was compounded by a:

* Pilot training problem. On LionAir, pilots were never even told about the MCAS, and by the time of the Ethiopian flight, there was an emergency AD issued, but no one had done sim training on this failure. This was compounded by an:

* Economic problem. Boeing sells an option package that includes an extra AoA vane, and an AoA disagree light, which lets pilots know that this problem was happening. Both 737MAXes that crashed were delivered without this option. No 737MAX with this option has ever crashed.

All of this was compounded by a:
* Pilot expertise problem. If the pilots had correctly and quickly identified the problem and run the stab trim runaway checklist, they would not have crashed.

Nowhere in here is there a software problem. The computers & software performed their jobs according to spec without error. The specification was just [cencored]. Now the quickest way for Boeing to solve this mess is to call up the software guys to come up with another band-aid.

I'm a software engineer, and we're sometimes called on to fix the deficiencies of mechanical or aero or electrical engineering, because the metal has already been cut or the molds have already been made or the chip has already been fabed, and so that problem can't be solved.

But the software can always be pushed to the update server or reflashed. When the software band-aid comes off in a 500mph wind, it's tempting to just blame the band-aid.

https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2019-03- ... e-engineer

[grandis_GT]

menarik artikel ini.

The Best Analysis Of What Really Happened To The Boeing 737 Max From A Pilot & Software Engineer

1of x: BEST analysis of what really is happening on the #Boeing737Max issue from my brother in law @davekammeyer, who’s a pilot, software engineer & deep thinker. Bottom line don’t blame software that’s the band aid for many other engineering and economic forces in effect.🎖

Some people are calling the 737MAX tragedies a #software failure. Here's my response: It's not a software problem. It was an
* Economic problem that the 737 engines used too much fuel, so they decided to install more efficient engines with bigger fans and make the 737MAX.

This led to an
* Airframe problem. They wanted to use the 737 airframe for economic reasons, but needed more ground clearance with bigger engines.The 737 design can't be practically modified to have taller main landing gear. The solution was to mount them higher & more forward.

This led to an
* Aerodynamic problem. The airframe with the engines mounted differently did not have adequately stable handling at high AoA to be certifiable. Boeing decided to create the MCAS system to electronically correct for the aircraft's handling deficiencies.

During the course of developing the MCAS, there was a
* Systems engineering problem. Boeing wanted the simplest possible fix that fit their existing systems architecture, so that it required minimal engineering rework, and minimal new training for pilots and maintenance crews.

The easiest way to do this was to add some features to the existing Elevator Feel Shift system. Like the #EFS system, the #MCAS relies on non-redundant sensors to decide how much trim to add. Unlike the EFS system, MCAS can make huge nose down trim changes.

On both ill-fated flights, there was a:
* Sensor problem. The AoA vane on the 737MAX appears to not be very reliable and gave wildly wrong readings. On #LionAir, this was compounded by a

* Maintenance practices problem. The previous crew had experienced the same problem and didn't record the problem in the maintenance logbook. This was compounded by a:

* Pilot training problem. On LionAir, pilots were never even told about the MCAS, and by the time of the Ethiopian flight, there was an emergency AD issued, but no one had done sim training on this failure. This was compounded by an:

* Economic problem. Boeing sells an option package that includes an extra AoA vane, and an AoA disagree light, which lets pilots know that this problem was happening. Both 737MAXes that crashed were delivered without this option. No 737MAX with this option has ever crashed.

All of this was compounded by a:
* Pilot expertise problem. If the pilots had correctly and quickly identified the problem and run the stab trim runaway checklist, they would not have crashed.

Nowhere in here is there a software problem. The computers & software performed their jobs according to spec without error. The specification was just [cencored]. Now the quickest way for Boeing to solve this mess is to call up the software guys to come up with another band-aid.

I'm a software engineer, and we're sometimes called on to fix the deficiencies of mechanical or aero or electrical engineering, because the metal has already been cut or the molds have already been made or the chip has already been fabed, and so that problem can't be solved.

But the software can always be pushed to the update server or reflashed. When the software band-aid comes off in a 500mph wind, it's tempting to just blame the band-aid.

https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2019-03- ... e-engineer

berarti bisa di bilang cacat design ya om , desain airframe 50 tahun lalu di maksimalkan bagaimanapun caranya

[iwing]

lha bukan nya udah suspect kalo si pembaca kecepatan yang problem ya. kenapa malah lari2 ke masalah lain..?? atau memang pesawat model ini 'menyimpan' masalah2 lain juga..??

[Turboman]

Konon MCAS di 737 MEK itu karena penempatan mesin yg maju ke depan, secara naturally cenderung bikin idung pesawat mendongak ke atas

MCAS ibarat Stability Control utk mencegah idung pesawat mendongak

mesin LEAP ini High ByPass ratio dgn Gentong besar bertujuan supaya irit BBM memang........High By Pass dgn kipas besar mirip spt Final Drive di mobil dgn rasio halus (mendekati 1) supaya lari 100 dgn RPM yg rendah

wkwkwkwkw

CMIIW

[osbertc0ol]

numpang minyak gan.

intinya sih menurut dari yang gw baca sih ya boing maksain airframe jadul, dan kestabilan bisa di avchieve dengan "stability control" kurang baik.

[Pugman]

Konon MCAS di 737 MEK itu karena penempatan mesin yg maju ke depan, secara naturally cenderung bikin idung pesawat mendongak ke atas

MCAS ibarat Stability Control utk mencegah idung pesawat mendongak

mesin LEAP ini High ByPass ratio dgn Gentong besar bertujuan supaya irit BBM memang........High By Pass dgn kipas besar mirip spt Final Drive di mobil dgn rasio halus (mendekati 1) supaya lari 100 dgn RPM yg rendah

wkwkwkwkw

CMIIW

Apa roda pendarat belakang benar-benar sudah ga bisa dinaikkan lagi ya? Tapi kalau roda naik, tujuan awalnya untuk easy cargo handling jadi terganggu.

Menggeser sayap sedikit keatas juga ga mungkin ya?

[Turboman]

Konon MCAS di 737 MEK itu karena penempatan mesin yg maju ke depan, secara naturally cenderung bikin idung pesawat mendongak ke atas

MCAS ibarat Stability Control utk mencegah idung pesawat mendongak

mesin LEAP ini High ByPass ratio dgn Gentong besar bertujuan supaya irit BBM memang........High By Pass dgn kipas besar mirip spt Final Drive di mobil dgn rasio halus (mendekati 1) supaya lari 100 dgn RPM yg rendah

wkwkwkwkw

CMIIW

Apa roda pendarat belakang benar-benar sudah ga bisa dinaikkan lagi ya? Tapi kalau roda naik, tujuan awalnya untuk easy cargo handling jadi terganggu.

Menggeser sayap sedikit keatas juga ga mungkin ya?

kalo gitu mending ada 787 versi buntet aja........ini mah udah jelas disain proporsional

Bukan Agya dimasukkin 1VD

aakakakakakkak

[Salvanost]

https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-as ... ast-flight

Sadis...
Kan yg lion ada berita kalau emang pesawatnya udah masalah di beberapa penerbangan sebelumnya

Nah ini ada cerita kalau kasus yg sama pernah terjadi sebelum kecelakaan lion air tapi yg ini srlamat berkat pilotnya tau solusinya apa

[super98]

Terungkap! Pilot Lion Air PK-LQP Panik Cek Buku Panduan Sebelum Jatuh
https://news.detik.com/internasional/d- ... elum-jatuh

[Salvanost]

Makin hari makin terbuka fakta ini pesawat
Ini pesawat ngaco banget....

Ga yakin dengan aoftware update bakalan selesai masalah
Malah lempar tanggung jawab ke pilot

[arfs]

[Turboman]

suru mbah ACT nge remap MCAS Boing

[lemonadelovers]

menarik artikel ini.

The Best Analysis Of What Really Happened To The Boeing 737 Max From A Pilot & Software Engineer

1of x: BEST analysis of what really is happening on the #Boeing737Max issue from my brother in law @davekammeyer, who’s a pilot, software engineer & deep thinker. Bottom line don’t blame software that’s the band aid for many other engineering and economic forces in effect.🎖

Some people are calling the 737MAX tragedies a #software failure. Here's my response: It's not a software problem. It was an
* Economic problem that the 737 engines used too much fuel, so they decided to install more efficient engines with bigger fans and make the 737MAX.

This led to an
* Airframe problem. They wanted to use the 737 airframe for economic reasons, but needed more ground clearance with bigger engines.The 737 design can't be practically modified to have taller main landing gear. The solution was to mount them higher & more forward.

This led to an
* Aerodynamic problem. The airframe with the engines mounted differently did not have adequately stable handling at high AoA to be certifiable. Boeing decided to create the MCAS system to electronically correct for the aircraft's handling deficiencies.

During the course of developing the MCAS, there was a
* Systems engineering problem. Boeing wanted the simplest possible fix that fit their existing systems architecture, so that it required minimal engineering rework, and minimal new training for pilots and maintenance crews.

The easiest way to do this was to add some features to the existing Elevator Feel Shift system. Like the #EFS system, the #MCAS relies on non-redundant sensors to decide how much trim to add. Unlike the EFS system, MCAS can make huge nose down trim changes.

On both ill-fated flights, there was a:
* Sensor problem. The AoA vane on the 737MAX appears to not be very reliable and gave wildly wrong readings. On #LionAir, this was compounded by a

* Maintenance practices problem. The previous crew had experienced the same problem and didn't record the problem in the maintenance logbook. This was compounded by a:

* Pilot training problem. On LionAir, pilots were never even told about the MCAS, and by the time of the Ethiopian flight, there was an emergency AD issued, but no one had done sim training on this failure. This was compounded by an:

* Economic problem. Boeing sells an option package that includes an extra AoA vane, and an AoA disagree light, which lets pilots know that this problem was happening. Both 737MAXes that crashed were delivered without this option. No 737MAX with this option has ever crashed.

All of this was compounded by a:
* Pilot expertise problem. If the pilots had correctly and quickly identified the problem and run the stab trim runaway checklist, they would not have crashed.

Nowhere in here is there a software problem. The computers & software performed their jobs according to spec without error. The specification was just [cencored]. Now the quickest way for Boeing to solve this mess is to call up the software guys to come up with another band-aid.

I'm a software engineer, and we're sometimes called on to fix the deficiencies of mechanical or aero or electrical engineering, because the metal has already been cut or the molds have already been made or the chip has already been fabed, and so that problem can't be solved.

But the software can always be pushed to the update server or reflashed. When the software band-aid comes off in a 500mph wind, it's tempting to just blame the band-aid.

https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2019-03- ... e-engineer

Di artikel ini kesannya klo mau selamat pakai pesawat ini banyak syarat dan ketentuannya, yaa intinya jg cuci tangan sih

[Salvanost]

Mungkin anda telah mendengar tentang MCAS, software yang secara otomatis menurunkan moncong 737 Max ke bawah untuk menghindari moncong pesawat mengarah terlalu ke atas ketika mengudara(stall). Itu ada karena Boeing ingin mengupgrade 737-nya tanpa mengubahnya keseluruhan desain lamanya, dengan menambah mesin-mesin baru yang membuat pesawat lebih mudah stall daripada mendesain pseawat baru dari awal.

Dalam dua kecelakaan yang terjadi diperkirakan penyebabnya adalah gagal software karena sensor tidak berfungsi dengan baik.
Tetapi semua itu tidak ada artinya di samping apa yang akan menjadi sorotan investigasi atas insiden tersebut: pelatihan dan user experient dari orang-orang di kokpit. Pilot tidak memiliki pelatihan yang cukup untuk memahami cara kerja MCAS dan dua fitur keselamatan vital — tampilan untuk menunjukkan apa yang dideteksi sensor, dan peringatan ringan jika sensor lain tidak mendeteksi adanya masalah adalah fitur opsional (harus bayar lagi).

Meminimalkan pelatihan dan pengurangan fitur keselamatan adalah keputusan ekonomi: Pesawat akan lebih menarik bagi pembeli potensial jika mereka tidak harus menghabiskan waktu dan biaya mahal untuk melatih pilot mereka. Administrasi Penerbangan Federal menetapkan standar keamanan boeing 737 max baik2 saja. Sekarang, semua orang ingin tahu alasan di balik penetapan standar keamanan tersebut? Jawabannya karena pelatihan bisa mahal untuk Boeing dan bisa mempengaruhi reputasi Amerika sebagai pemimpin dalam penerapan teknologi penerbangan yang aman.

Software mudah disalahkan, karena bagi banyak orang ilmu komputer adalah sebuah misteri. Namun, kecelakaan ini muncul dari hal yang kita semua tahu, tekanan untuk memenuhi jadwal yang ketat, godaan untuk mengambil jalan pintas, dan harapan bahwa satu kesalahan kecil tidak akan mengacaukan keseluruhan program penjualan boeing 737 max.

Kini banyak orang menyalahkan memodernisasi desain pesawat lama dengan bantuan software. Apalagi jika hal tersebut didasari oleh ingin mencari keuntungan dengan merecycle desain pesawat lamanya.

[Zaxis]

Media amrik lg giring opini salahin pilot krg training dan maintenance jelek
Boing bisa kolaps kalo airlines rame2 cancel order

[qushay20019]

GIA (Garuda Indonesia) batalin pesenan Boeing MAX 8 nya. Sukur deh...

https://www.theguardian.com/business/20 ... max-8-jets

[Turboman]

Bikin model baru en versi buntet nya di bawah 230 penumpang re-label jadi 737........namakan 737 Reborn.......akakaka

images%20-%202019-03-24T084642.337.jpeg